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Alain Roux, Le singe et le tigre : Mao,
un destin chinois (Monkey and tiger:
Mao, a Chinese destiny)
Paris, Larousse 2009, 1127 pp. 
Lucien Bianco
Translation : N. Jayaram
1 We now have a monumental biography of
Mao in French:  nearly  900 pages  of  text
and 200 pages of notes ! And all this text is
not only highly detailed, it is also reliable,
generally accurate, and always impartial.
Right  in  the  introduction  (p.  9),  Alain
Roux tells the reader that the author of a
biography ought to feel some empathy for
his  subject.  Most  gratifyingly,  this
empathy  is  manifested  especially,  and
most  discreetly,  at  the  very  end  of  the
book,  following  a  long  display  of
professional  rigour,  just  when  the  man
behind  the  biographer  was  required  to
speak  his  mind.  Throughout  the  book,
Roux does not spare Mao, and rightly so.
He tries  to  understand Mao and explain
his  motivations,  but  then  arrives  at
objective  conclusions:  the  verdict  is
measured and well argued. Roux’s conclusion: Mao was no crude tyrant, but a utopian
who sought  to  do  good to  people,  without  asking  for  their  opinion.  As  Mao never
doubted  his  illusions  and  failed  to  admit  his  faults,  he  ended  up  causing  genuine
disaster. Thanks to the Leninist system that conferred absolute power to the top leader,
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China had to wait until  his death for its people’s renaissance… and for the Chinese
revolution to rebound, albeit by rejecting its tenets.
2 The detailed table of contents (pp. 1116-1127) facilitates browsing a given passage to
check up on an event, a theme or even just a date, not only in Mao’s life but also in the
history of Chinese communism and of the People’s Republic until 1976. There are three
major phases: the adolescent and young rebel up until Jinggangshan (late 1927) ; the
revolutionary (1927-1945) ; and finally the despot (1945-1976). Placing the second major
break at the end of the Second World War rather than 1949 does not trouble me, as Mao
enjoyed despotic power at Yan’an right from the early 1940s. The last two parts begin
(pp. 221-222 and 484) with a clear résumé of the stages to follow. Also, at the start of
some chapters (such as Chapter 9, p. 384, Chapter 12, p. 534, and Chapter 13, p. 597),
one or two illuminating pages of material announce the major themes developed in the
50 or so pages to follow. But sometimes it is the conclusion that captures the essence
with vigour (as, for instance, in Chapter 6, p. 275): “In the space of three years (from
Jinggangshan to the bloody repression of the Futian mutiny),  there came about the
transformation  of  an  intellectual  engaged  in  politics  to  liberate  the  oppressed  and
deliver his country from the oppression of great powers, into a wily and cruel warlord
who held that the end justified the means.”
3 I cannot resist noting the rich anthology of Mao’s quotations, some well known and
others  pure  finds.  In  1919  he  wrote  in  his  diary: “There  is  an  extremist  party  of
violence...  The head of  this  party is  a  certain Marx,  born in Germany” (p.  70).  The
following year, he converted to federalism: the Hunan republic was “the only formula
for saving China” (p. 86) ; but this did not prevent him from declaring three years later:
“We are still opposed to a federation of autonomous provinces” (p. 130). It was the first
attack of political amnesia, Roux observes sagely. The nationalist-turned-federalist and
then disciplined communist  militant  was hiding his  brutal  metamorphosis.  Another
contradiction  within  a  few  years’  gap,  attributable  less  to  Party  diktat  than  to
experience and personal reflection: in 1930, he warned against the declassed (Marx’s
Lumpenproletariat) – “dangerous men, ready to sell themselves to the ruling classes,”
even though he had counted on their military prowess and revolutionary capacity in
the famous “Analysis of classes in rural society” in 1926 (pp. 264-65). There were more
contradictions, and more disastrous ones, as at the height of the Great Leap ravages
(pp. 643-45 and passim), when strokes of lucidity punctuated the illusions to which he
clung to the detriment of tens of millions of famine victims. Roux rightly diagnoses that
when the famine turned more serious between 1959 and 1961, Mao turned a blind eye
(p. 675) despite being warned in September 1958 that 500 people had starved to death
in northern Anhui (pp. 640-41).
4 This  is  a  recurring  enigma:  the  same  man  who  could  see  more  clearly  than  his
comrades and colleagues in so many situations was subject to aberrations that could
have been avoided with a modicum of good sense, doubt, or modesty. It is tempting to
conclude that his qualities (and not just his intrigues and ruses) helped impose him as
chief and that it would have been better for just about any pragmatist short on ideas to
have been at  the rudder than this  crank installed as Great  Helmsman. One note of
caution,  though:  absolute  power  would  have  driven  astray  the  most  solid  of
pragmatists.  Moreover, peasant strategy was his,  as was the early realisation of the
necessity of having an army (pp. 194-95), the creation of autonomous regional bases, or
even the  egoistic  and fecund decision to  go  easy  in  fighting  the  Japanese  so  as  to
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conserve forces for a decisive settling of scores with the Kuomintang. And it was the
patriot Peng Dehuai who launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive (August 1940) at
the risk of provoking a disastrous Japanese counter-offensive (pp. 416-17). As for the
unending series of disasters Mao incited from 1955 to 1976, I will spare the reader the
list here.
5 What comes as no mystery, however, was that he was allowed to get away with it. That
Mao counted on mass enthusiasm (which Lenin and Stalin avoided taking for granted)
in order to attain the unrealistic objectives he fixed (pp. 561 and 577-78), all the while
brutally  suppressing  their  aspirations  (“the  peasants  want  freedom,  we  want
socialism”), is of a piece with the contradictions in his personality. However, for the
oligarchs’ shameful rallying behind the omnipotent chief, for their removal of the last
vestiges of opposition to his utopian ravages (at Nanning in January 1958, p. 622), or for
their capitulation (the following year at Lushan, p. 667) in the ouster of Peng Dehuai,
who was saying what they all were thinking, the blame can be laid at the door of “the
system.” In other words, Leninism accounted for it, with no need to incriminate Mao’s
idiosyncrasies. The system created the same pitfalls as in the Soviet Union in 1929-30:
“Promotions of local and regional cadres for their political docility rather than their
managerial competence or clarity were to begin as early as in mid-May (1958) to rival
those seeking to rise faster and higher” (pp. 627-28). And this system also determined
the manner in which major decisions were made: on 26 August 1967, between two and
three in the morning (Mao’s biological clock kept him awake much of the night), he
dictated: “Wang Li [welcomed as a hero on return from Wuhan the previous month],
Guan Feng, and Qi Benyu destroy the Cultural Revolution and are not good people” (p.
793). The source of all truth having been proclaimed, the rupture with radical Maoists
(who failed to jettison his own teachings trumpeted from the rooftops the previous
year) was complete, and the “Great People’s Cultural Revolution” was to follow a much
different course.
6 The system kept Mao in power despite his blunders and his blind and headstrong ways,
but the incidental differences with Stalinism were his own. Roux has summarised them
elegantly, concluding that it was the failure of the “populist variant of Soviet state-
socialism” (p. 813).
7 My reservations, and I do have some, pertain not to the book’s substance as such. A
certain number of inaccuracies are to be found in the details, not in the whole: Peng Pai
was not  really  of  peasant  origin as  Mao was (Peng was from a very rich family  of
landlords) ;  Mao could not have met Robert  Payne at  Yan’an in the spring of  1949,
because  he  was  not  there  then ;  Peng  Shuzhi’s  interviews  with  Chen  Ying-hsiang,
Claude Cadart, and myself were not conducted in 1983, the year of Peng’s death, but in
1969 and 1970. Other inaccuracies concern the text: Mao could not have commented on
1 November 1919 over the suicide of a Miss Zhao, which occurred on the 14th ; after
being  arrested  on  12  September  1927,  Mao  could  not  have  rejoined  his  “troop”
following a harassing march on 10 September ; Luo Ruiqing attempted suicide on 18
March 1966, as noted, but the treatment that caused the suicide could not have begun
on 4 April. The contents of some paragraphs (as in pp. 499-502 and 786-89) have little to
do with the preceding headings.  Repetitions abound,  and references are sometimes
wrongly given or not given at all. It would have been better had endnotes been listed by
chapter (there are 1,262 notes in the third part alone). As many as 12 notes attributed
to Chapter 3 belong in fact to Chapter 2 (pp. 918-19), while Chapter 4 usurps 15 notes
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from the previous chapter (pp. 927-28). The editor may be to blame for these minor
errors and for some faulty transcriptions, spelling mistakes, and misprints (Freud for
Friend on page 917).
8 While  I  might  list  minor  errors  and  technical  imperfections  (largely  made  up  for
through  exhaustive  documentation),  I  would  nevertheless  prefer  to  consult  Roux’s
book any time I need to verify some point of history of the PRC or figure out Mao’s
motives in a certain episode. It has emerged as one of those rare and indispensable
books for  practitioners  of  our discipline.  The unsuspecting reader might risk being
discouraged by the vast array of facts, but I must stress that the introductions to the
various parts offer steady guidance.
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